SITREP 11
WASHINGTON DC 27MAR2026
UPDATE SUMMARY
Day 28 of Operation Epic Fury and the clock problem is now in full view. President Trump extended his deadline for Iranian energy infrastructure strikes by ten days — to April 6 — framing it as a response to an Iranian government request. Tehran responded by launching a fresh missile salvo at Netanya, physically turning back three ships at the Strait of Hormuz, striking Kuwait’s main commercial port in a dawn drone attack, and publishing five ceasefire conditions that include Iranian sovereignty over the Strait itself and war reparations — terms designed to be unacceptable. The IRGC also issued a direct warning to civilians across the region to vacate any location housing US forces, naming hotels explicitly. Secretary of State Rubio arrived in France for a G7 foreign ministers meeting to seek allied support for Hormuz — on the same day Trump publicly insulted NATO allies for refusing to help. UK military intelligence confirmed Russia provided not just intelligence but pre-war training to Iran. That is no longer an inference. The “hidden hand of Putin” is on the record, from a NATO member’s defence chief, on Day 28 of the war he helped enable.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
· Trump extends Iran energy-plant strike pause 10 days to April 6, citing active talks via Pakistan; says Iranian government itself requested the extension — Iran denies requesting it. [1]
· Iran rejects US 15-point peace proposal; publishes five ceasefire conditions including war compensation and Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz — terms Washington cannot accept. [2]
· IRGC enforces Hormuz blockade by physically turning back three ships; Kuwait’s main commercial port struck in dawn drone attack on March 27. [3]
· IRGC issues direct civilian warning to vacate locations housing US forces across the region, explicitly naming hotels — a soft-target escalation signal. [4]
· UK military intelligence confirms Russia provided pre-war training to Iran alongside active ISR sharing of US force positions — British defence chief cites “hidden hand of Putin.” [5]
· IRGC Navy commander Admiral Alireza Tangsiri confirmed killed in Israeli strike at Bandar Abbas; CENTCOM issues stand-down call to all IRGC Navy personnel. [6]
· Iranian missile salvo strikes Netanya on Day 28; IRGC Aerospace Force claims strikes on Dimona and Haifa as direct responses to US threats. [7]
· US-Israeli strikes now reaching Mashhad in Khorasan Razavi Province — the northeastern-most strikes in the campaign — as the air campaign sweeps east across Iranian territory. [8]
· IDF accelerating strikes on Iranian ballistic missile production over next 48 hours per US source — specifically to destroy as much launcher and factory capacity as possible before any ceasefire window opens. [9]
· G7 Foreign Ministers convene in Cernay-la-Ville, France; Rubio attends as Trump simultaneously attacks NATO allies for refusing to help reopen Hormuz, directly undermining Rubio’s coalition-building mission. [10]
· Zelensky signs defence cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, transferring Ukrainian drone defence expertise and technology to the Kingdom. [11]
· Finnish President Stubb warns the conflict could produce a “self-inflicted global recession” worse than COVID. [12]
· Pentagon weighing shift of Ukraine military aid toward Middle East; Russia launches 153 drones overnight at Ukraine, striking Kharkiv residential buildings. [13]
CRISIS MODULE — ACTIVE: IRAN / OPERATION EPIC FURY (Day 28)
SITUATION SUMMARY
The war enters Day 28 in the pattern the Iranian framework anticipated from Day 1: Washington asserting that talks are “going very well,” Tehran asserting no talks exist, and the kinetic tempo unchanged. Trump’s extension of the pause to April 6 was framed as an Iranian government request — which Iran immediately denied. The extension was obtained free of charge: no Hormuz reopening, no pause in missile attacks, no acceptance of talks. Foreign Minister Araghchi’s statement “We do not want a ceasefire” because it would produce a “vicious cycle of repeated war” is the most analytically significant Iranian statement since the campaign began. Tehran is not seeking an exit from this war. It is seeking a settlement that forecloses the next American military action. Those are structurally different objectives, and only the second is what Iran is prepared to negotiate toward.
AIR OPERATIONS
Israeli Air Force conducted an overnight strike package on Tehran targeting ballistic missile launch sites, weapon manufacturing facilities, a component production site for ballistic missiles, a battery production facility, and an IRGC weapons production facility. In western Iran, the IAF struck IRGC and Iranian Army fire arrays throughout the night. Israeli Defence Minister Katz announced that IDF strikes will intensify and expand to “additional targets and domains.” A US source briefed on operations confirmed a deliberate Israeli acceleration over the next 48 hours to destroy as much launcher and factory capacity as possible before any ceasefire window. [9] Israel also struck the underwater research center in Isfahan — the IDF’s description of it as the only Iranian facility for submarine design and development makes this a mission-kill on naval reconstitution capacity. Strikes this week have reached Mashhad in Khorasan Razavi Province — the northeastern-most strikes in the campaign to date — extending the air campaign west to east across Iranian territory. [8]
MARITIME / HORMUZ
The IRGC Navy is now enforcing the Hormuz blockade through active interdiction: three ships were physically turned back attempting to transit on March 27. Iran’s Defence Council has warned that an attack on Iranian southern coast or islands would result in sea mines deployed across the wider Gulf — threatening to transform the entire waterway, not just the Strait, into a no-go zone. Hormuz reopening remains assessed at months, not weeks. [3] Admiral Alireza Tangsiri — the IRGC Navy commander most directly responsible for the Hormuz blockade strategy — was confirmed killed in an Israeli strike at Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province. CENTCOM issued a public stand-down call to IRGC Navy personnel. Despite Tangsiri’s death, the blockade remained in effect as of this writing. Kuwait’s main commercial port was struck in a dawn drone attack on March 27. [6][3]
DRONE / MISSILE
As of Day 26, Iran has launched a cumulative 1,597 ballistic missiles, 3,770 drones, and 28 cruise missiles since the war began, per JINSA tracking. Daily ballistic missile rates have fluctuated significantly: 20-21 on March 20-21, 26 on March 22, 21 on March 23, spiking to 46 on March 24 — the highest single-day count in recent weeks — and at least 26 on March 25. The March 24 spike was notable for target distribution: 17 ballistic missiles at Kuwait and seven at Bahrain, representing a deliberate shift toward Gulf state infrastructure. US, Israeli, and Arab air defenses have intercepted over 90 percent of Iranian missiles and drones fired during the war, per JINSA’s “Eroding Shield” analysis — but that report also warns of growing strain on high-end interceptors including Patriot PAC-3, THAAD, and SM-3. [14]
SOFT-TARGET ESCALATION
The IRGC issued a direct regional warning on March 27 urging civilians to immediately vacate any location housing US forces, explicitly naming hotels. This follows earlier Iranian threats to target hotels housing US soldiers. The warning came on the same morning Kuwait’s commercial port was struck by a drone. Iran is extending its strike calculus beyond military installations toward commercial and civilian-adjacent infrastructure. [4]
DIPLOMATIC / POLITICAL
US delivered a 15-point plan to Iran via Pakistan. Iran responded through unnamed intermediaries calling it “maximalist and unreasonable.” Iran’s five counter-conditions: full end to aggression with concrete guarantees against recurrence; payment of war damages and compensation; a comprehensive end to the war across all fronts including against “all resistance groups” — meaning Israel cannot continue Lebanon as a separate operation; and recognition of Iranian Strait sovereignty. The conditions function as a public refusal while leaving back-channel message exchanges intact via Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey. [2] Trump said Iran is “begging to make a deal.” Tehran called him “deceitful.” Iran’s military spokesperson asked: “Have your internal conflicts reached the point of you negotiating with yourselves?” Witkoff confirmed a “15-point action list” at the Thursday Cabinet meeting and said there is a “strong possibility” an agreement can be reached. [1][2] The IRGC is also under visible manpower pressure: an IRGC cultural official told Iranian state media the Corps has lowered its minimum recruitment age to 12 in response to wartime demands. [15]
CRISIS MODULE — ELEVATED: UKRAINE (Day 1,493)
The most consequential Ukraine development is strategic, not battlefield: the Pentagon is evaluating whether to shift Ukraine military assistance toward Middle East requirements as Epic Fury demand grows. This has not been announced as policy, but the signal will be heard in Moscow and Kyiv simultaneously. [13] Russia launched 153 drones at Ukraine overnight March 26-27, with 130 intercepted. Eight civilians were injured in Kharkiv drone strikes on a residential high-rise. Russia carried out 201 combat engagements in a recent 24-hour period, deploying 92 airstrikes and 257 guided aerial bombs. ISW’s March 26 assessment confirms continued Russian offensive operations across multiple axes including Vovchansk. [13] On the ground, ISW data for the four-week period February 24 through March 24 shows Russia lost four square miles of Ukrainian territory — a sharp reversal from fifty square miles gained the prior four-week period. Ukraine retains a counterattack posture in Zaporizhzhia; Russia is responding with intensified activity toward Huliaypole. [13] The Zelensky-Saudi Arabia defence cooperation agreement signed March 26 — Ukraine transferring drone defence expertise to Riyadh — places Ukrainian counter-drone technology inside the Epic Fury theatre and signals Zelensky building a Middle Eastern security relationship that partially hedges against US aid disruption. [11]
WATCH ITEMS
TAIWAN STRAIT: PLA carrier and PLAAF ADIZ activity near zero since January 2026. Beijing watching Epic Fury force posture and US munitions expenditure closely. No change to Watch status. KOREAN PENINSULA: No KCNA-confirmed Kim Jong-un appearance. No new missile tests. Pyongyang’s silence through Day 28 consistent with strategic watching brief. CUBA: No immediate escalation indicators. Structural pressure accelerating. Cuba has lost both primary energy patrons simultaneously — Venezuela (Maduro removed, January) and Iran (under sustained attack) — while the US oil blockade remains in effect. Windward Maritime AI detected sharply reduced tanker arrivals and possible dark activity near Cuban energy infrastructure as of March 10-11. DNI 2026 Annual Threat Assessment (March 18) flagged Cuban instability as a migration risk driver and confirmed Russia is expanding security ties with Cuba and Nicaragua. Graham’s “Cuba’s next” statement stands as political direction, deferred not abandoned. Watch for: dark tanker activity resumption, post-Epic Fury State/ODNI escalatory language, Graham’s framing returning to Fox News. WATCH. GLOBAL ECONOMY: Brent crude at $99.75 on March 25, up $26.64 from $71.49 a month ago. Finnish President Stubb warned of a “self-inflicted global recession” worse than COVID — “the demise of international institutions at exactly the moment we need them most.” Philippines transport sector struck March 20 over fuel costs, explicitly citing the Hormuz crisis. UN food and agriculture chief Torero warned that a conflict extending three to six months will severely affect food security and economic development globally. [12] VENEZUELA / SAHEL: No significant change.
ANALYSIS & OPINION
NSD PRIOR ANALYSIS (72-HOUR RULE)
No new NSD publications in the last 72 hours. Full analytical archive: substack.com/@milab
STANDING REFERENCES (active this brief): ▸ “The ‘Leaked’ Document: Tehran’s War Plan for Regime Change in Washington” — NSD/MILab, 11 March 2026 · milab.substack.com/p/leaked-document-tehrans-war-plan Iran’s five-condition counter-document confirms the framework: Tehran is not seeking an exit — it is seeking terms that foreclose the next war. [RT-1] ▸ “A Hybrid World War” — NSD/MILab, 23 October 2023 · milab.substack.com UK intelligence has placed Russia inside Epic Fury operationally. The theoretical spine of NSD’s analytical framework is now confirmed by a NATO member’s defence chief. [HWW-1]
EXTERNAL ANALYSIS
JINSA’s “Eroding Shield: Air Defenses Against Iran” (March 25) provides the most rigorous public accounting of the interceptor economics problem. Over 90 percent interception rate is operationally impressive. The exchange ratio it requires — burning $4-15M interceptors against $20-50K drones at sustained pace — is not strategically sustainable indefinitely. The April 6 deadline is as much about interceptor burn rate as it is about political optics. CSIS analysis of the pre-war nuclear negotiations confirms the Oman-brokered “breakthrough” masked an unresolved enrichment disagreement that was never closed before strikes commenced. Iran’s five ceasefire conditions make that structural divergence explicit and permanent as a negotiating gap.
NSD ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT
KEY DRIVING ASSUMPTION — EPIC FURY (STANDING)
The campaign’s decisive terrain is not kinetic. Trump requires a short, concludable war before the 2026 midterm cycle, domestic energy prices, and Congressional pressure force a political reckoning. The IRGC requires the opposite: a war long enough and unresolved enough to deny him a clean exit. Today’s evidence: The April 6 extension was obtained by Tehran free — without reopening Hormuz, without pausing missile attacks, without accepting talks. Iran’s published five conditions do not permit Trump a credible victory declaration. The clock is running. Every extension is evidence the strategy is working.
72-HOUR TRAJECTORY
— Likely (55-70%): Kinetic tempo continues at current pace. Hormuz blockade holds. IRGC expands targeting of Gulf commercial infrastructure consistent with today’s hotel warning. G7 produces language on Hormuz but no allied military commitment. Pakistan back-channel remains the only active diplomatic corridor. — Likely (55-70%): April 6 becomes the next inflection point, not a resolution point. The 15-point / 5-condition gap is not bridgeable in this window. The deadline will be extended again, rhetorically compressed, or Trump will strike energy infrastructure while simultaneously claiming negotiations continue. — Unlikely (below 30%): A ceasefire framework both sides can announce before April 6. Araghchi’s “we do not want a ceasefire” is not a negotiating posture. It is a strategic declaration. One of Iran’s five conditions — most likely the Hormuz sovereignty language — would need to be quietly reframed. No current signal of that.
CRITICAL UNKNOWNS
Who in Iran has authority to accept a deal? Araghchi’s public posture and the intermediary back-channel are contradictory. If IRGC field commanders retained operational independence after Khamenei’s death and Mojtaba’s confirmation gap, Pezeshkian may not be able to commit to terms the IRGC would enforce. This is Scenario 4 in active watch.
What is the actual status of Mojtaba Khamenei’s command authority? Written statements only — no video or audio confirmed in 28 days. The man who notionally holds IRGC political authorization for Option X has been absent from open-source confirmation since Day 1. IRGC Aerospace Force commander posting independent public warnings to Trump on X — bypassing the foreign ministry — is a fragmentation indicator accumulating alongside the confirmation gap.
What did the B-1 Lancers departing RAF Fairford on March 26 target? Campaign-wide reporting places Fairford-based B-1s against Iranian ballistic missile sites and launch infrastructure. No outlet has published a mission-specific target list for the March 26 sortie. Westminster was briefed in a March 23 Commons debate; Defence Secretary Healey’s “defensive action” framing is under formal legal challenge — independent analysis assesses the authorization as blurring the boundary between collective self-defence and co-belligerence in an offensive air campaign. The government has not shifted its formal position. The accountability gap is real, documented, and unresolved. [16]
ANTICIPATORY WORST-CASE SCENARIOS — STATUS UPDATE
Scenario 1 (CONUS/Soft-Target Drone Strike): Watch elevated. The IRGC hotel warning issued today is the closest open-source indicator to this scenario since the Fort McNair baseline reports. The logic of targeting civilian-adjacent infrastructure does not stop at the Gulf. Probability: LOW. Trending. Consequence: CATASTROPHIC.
Scenario 2 (Carrier Mission-Kill): Watch elevated — NSD CONCURS with probability modifier. Trump’s April 6 extension and “winding down” framing is precisely the trigger timing the red-team exercise identified as Iran’s optimal window for Option X. Tangsiri’s killing removed the Hormuz operational commander — IRGC naval command is in transition. If Option X requires explicit strategic authorization, the command vacuum increases the probability of uncoordinated execution. Probability: LOW-MEDIUM. Rising. Consequence: CATASTROPHIC.
Scenario 3 (Natanz Radiological): Watch. Isfahan underwater research center strike adds a new facility to the monitoring list. IAEA access to struck facilities unconfirmed. Probability: LOW. Consequence: EXISTENTIAL.
Scenario 4 (IRGC Command Fragmentation): Watch elevated — NSD CONCURS. Tangsiri killed. Mojtaba Khamenei unconfirmed 28 days. IRGC Aerospace Force commander posting independent public warnings to Trump on X. These are not isolated data points — they are a pattern of autonomous action exceeding the political authorization framework. Fragmentation accumulates through small decisions before it produces a catastrophic one. Probability: LOW-MEDIUM and rising. Consequence: CATASTROPHIC.
ANALYTICAL NOTE — HWW LENS
UK military intelligence has placed Russia inside Epic Fury operationally — not as a passive beneficiary but as a trainer and ISR provider. The Iran war and the Ukraine war are not parallel conflicts that happen to share an adversary network. They are the same operational theatre. Russia benefits from every US interceptor expended over the Gulf, every dollar of political capital burned at the G7, every week the Hormuz crisis delays the post-Ukraine diplomatic settlement. The Philippines is striking. Finland’s president is warning of a global recession. Saudi Arabia is signing drone deals with Ukraine. These are the downstream effects of a Hybrid World War operating across multiple theatres simultaneously. None of it is coincidence. All of it is connected.
LEADER LOCATOR — Confirmed Locations as of Friday, 27 March 2026
U.S. PRINCIPALS
▸ Donald Trump · President · White House, Washington DC White House pool, Greek Independence Day event confirmed March 26 · CONFIRMED
▸ Marco Rubio · Secretary of State · G7 Foreign Ministers Meeting, Cernay-la-Ville, France AP/AFP pool photography March 27 · CONFIRMED
▸ Steve Witkoff · Special Envoy · Washington DC Cabinet meeting confirmed March 26; no subsequent departure signal · ASSESSED CONUS
▸ Pete Hegseth · Secretary of Defense · Washington DC No confirmed departure signal · ASSESSED
ADVERSARY PRINCIPALS
▸ Mojtaba Khamenei · Son of Supreme Leader / de facto IRGC authority figure · UNKNOWN Written statements only. No video or audio confirmed since Day 1 of Epic Fury (February 28, 2026). 28-day confirmation gap. Standing assessment unchanged.
▸ Mohammad Javad Araghchi · Foreign Minister, Iran · Tehran (assessed) Public statements via Iranian state media March 25-26 · CONFIRMED via media
▸ Xi Jinping · General Secretary / President, China · Beijing (assessed) No confirmed public appearance signal today · ASSESSED
▸ Vladimir Putin · President, Russia · Moscow (assessed) No confirmed travel signal · ASSESSED
▸ Kim Jong-un · Supreme Leader, DPRK · UNKNOWN No KCNA-confirmed appearance
EUROPEAN / ALLIED PRINCIPALS
▸ Emmanuel Macron · President, France · Paris (assessed) G7 hosted in France; French FM Barrot present as host; Macron not confirmed at venue · ASSESSED
▸ Kaja Kallas · EU High Representative · Cernay-la-Ville, France AFP/AP pool photography March 27 · CONFIRMED
▸ Keir Starmer · Prime Minister, United Kingdom · London gov.uk domestic events confirmed March 27 · CONFIRMED ANALYTICAL NOTE: B-1 Lancers operated strike sorties from RAF Fairford March 26. Parliament debated UK basing March 23. Healey’s “defensive action” framing is under formal legal challenge. Target set of March 26 sorties unconfirmed. UK legal and parliamentary exposure unresolved.
▸ Friedrich Merz · Chancellor, Germany · Berlin (assessed) FM Wadephul confirmed at G7; Merz not confirmed independently today · ASSESSED
▸ Mark Rutte · NATO Secretary General · Brussels NATO calendar confirms Brussels-based meetings, no foreign travel · CONFIRMED
▸ Ursula von der Leyen · President, European Commission · Brussels EC calendar confirms Brussels engagements · CONFIRMED
ISRAELI PRINCIPALS
▸ Benjamin Netanyahu · Prime Minister, Israel · Jerusalem/Tel Aviv PMO assessment session with military officials confirmed; public statement on intensifying IDF strikes issued March 27 · CONFIRMED via PMO
UKRAINIAN PRINCIPALS
▸ Volodymyr Zelensky · President, Ukraine · Saudi Arabia (departing/departed) Defence cooperation agreement signing confirmed March 26 · CONFIRMED [11]
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ENDNOTES
[1] NPR / CNN — Trump extends energy-plant pause to April 6 — March 26-27, 2026 npr.org/2026/03/26/nx-s1-5761882/iran-war-peace-conditions cnn.com/2026/03/26/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump
[2] Al Jazeera / NPR — Iran rejects 15-point proposal; five conditions; “We do not want a ceasefire” — March 25-26, 2026 aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/25/iran-calls-us-proposal-to-end-war-maximalist-unreasonable npr.org/2026/03/25/nx-s1-5760675/iran-war-military-deployment
[3] Al-Monitor / Gulf News — IRGC turns back three ships; Kuwait commercial port struck; Hormuz closure declaration — March 27, 2026 al-monitor.com/originals/2026/03/iran-guards-warn-civilians-after-trump-pushes-hormuz-deadline
[4] Al-Monitor / Yahoo News SG — IRGC civilian warning; hotels named — March 27, 2026 al-monitor.com/originals/2026/03/iran-guards-warn-civilians-after-trump-pushes-hormuz-deadline sg.news.yahoo.com/irgc-warning-fuels-fears-iran-112844416.html
[5] CBS News / Gulf News — UK defence chief; Russian pre-war training and ISR to Iran; “hidden hand of Putin” — March 26, 2026 cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-trump-israel-tehran-denies-ceasefire-talks
[6] ISW/Critical Threats / Times of Israel — Tangsiri killed Bandar Abbas; CENTCOM stand-down call — March 26, 2026 criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-26-2026 timesofisrael.com/liveblog-march-27-2026
[7] Times of Israel / Al Jazeera — Netanya salvo; Dimona/Haifa IRGC claims; Katz escalation statement — March 27, 2026 timesofisrael.com/liveblog-march-27-2026
[8] ISW/Critical Threats — Mashhad strikes; campaign geographic expansion — March 25-26, 2026 criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-26-2026
[9] NPR / Times of Israel — IDF 48-hour acceleration; pre-ceasefire push on launchers and factories — March 26-27, 2026 npr.org/2026/03/26/nx-s1-5761882/iran-war-peace-conditions timesofisrael.com/liveblog-march-27-2026
[10] NPR / Washington Post — Rubio at G7 France; Trump NATO criticism — March 27, 2026 npr.org/2026/03/27/nx-s1-5763475/iran-war-talks-rubio-markets-g7 washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/03/27/g7-france-rubio-iran-war-allies-trump
[11] Reuters / BBC — Zelensky-Saudi Arabia defence cooperation agreement — March 26, 2026 reuters.com/world/middle-east/ukraines-zelenskiy-arrives-saudi-arabia-important-meetings-2026-03-26 bbc.com/news/articles/cx2r4wxdw3no
[12] TASS / Al Jazeera / Xinhua — Stubb “self-inflicted global recession”; Philippines transport strike; UN food economics warning — March 20-27, 2026 tass.com/world/2107839 aljazeera.com/gallery/2026/3/26/manilas-streets-empty-as-fuel-prices-surge-amid-strait-of-hormuz-crisis
[13] Kyiv Independent / ISW / Ukrinform — Pentagon Ukraine aid shift weighing; Russian drone strikes Kharkiv; ISW March 26 assessment — March 26-27, 2026 kyivindependent.com understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026
[14] JINSA — Epic Fury and Roaring Lion series; “Eroding Shield: Air Defenses Against Iran” — March 18-25, 2026 jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Operations-Epic-Fury-and-Roaring-Lion-03-25-26.pdf jinsa.org/jinsa_report/missile-defense-march-2026/
[15] ISW/Critical Threats — IRGC recruitment age lowered to 12 — March 26, 2026 criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-26-2026
[16] Air and Space Forces Magazine / Just Security / Drone Wars UK / Parallel Parliament — B-1 Fairford sorties; Commons March 23 debate; Healey statement; legal analysis of UK co-belligerence — March 2026 airandspaceforces.com/b-1s-b-52s-bombers-europe-iran-epic-fury justsecurity.org/133231/united-kingdom-iran-war-international-law dronewars.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Briefing-Use-of-Fairford-for-Strikes-against-Iran-Martch-2026.pdf parallelparliament.co.uk/debate/2026-03-23/commons/commons-chamber/middle-east
[RT-1] “The ‘Leaked’ Document: Tehran’s War Plan for Regime Change in Washington” — NSD/MILab, 11 March 2026 milab.substack.com/p/leaked-document-tehrans-war-plan
[HWW-1] “A Hybrid World War” — NSD/MILab, 23 October 2023 milab.substack.com
NSD SITREP is published by the National Security Desk. All sources open-source. ICD-203 analytic standards applied throughout. National Security Desk · https://substack.com/@milab





You seem like the folks to ask some practical questions:
1. What is the current level of preparedness at US bases in the Gulf. Reports that they have been effectively evacuated seem exaggerated given that they continue to intercept drones.
2. When the USS Tripoli and USS Boxer arrive in the region, how will they push through the straight?
Where will they dock?
Where will the troops disembark?
Assuming the troops will invade Kharg Island, how will they receive provisions?
What support can they expect from the bases in the region?
Thanks.
Just peachy.